We provide a theoretical analysis of promotion tournaments in which workers "strategically shirk" by purposely under-performing on tasks that are de-emphasized in a promotion rule, while over-performing in tasks that are emphasized in the rule, thereby increasing their chances of promotion and a wage increase. To mitigate the multitasking problem, the …rm might commit upfront to a promotion rule that requires more balance in the performances across tasks in a job than would otherwise be justi…ed on productivity grounds. The analysis shows how "Putt's Law" (which states that competent workers are sometimes passed over for promotion in favor of incompetent ones) can be understood as a natural consequence of the …rm designing optimal promotion rules.
Introduction
Starting with Lazear and Rosen (1981) , a large literature on tournament theory has evolved concerning the role of promotions in creating incentives.
1 The fundamental idea is that the prospect of getting promoted and receiving a higher wage motivates workers to exert more e¤ort or to invest more heavily in acquiring human capital, because such actions are performance enhancing and therefore improve a worker's promotion chances. In the standard theoretical models, shirking is not an attractive option for workers, because shirkers are likely to be either …red or outperformed by others who ultimately win a scarce number of promotions. But these results arise only because worker choices (and ultimately their performances) are assumed to be one dimensional, so that there is only one way to impress the boss. In reality, workers participating in promotion tournaments are engaged in multiple tasks, and weak performance on one task can be compensated by stellar performance on another. In such settings, a career-oriented worker may …nd it optimal to purposefully under-perform -i.e. "strategically shirk" -on one task, while over-performing on another, so as to in ‡uence future job assignments. Our goal in this study is to explore theoretically the implications of strategic shirking in promotion tournaments. The main idea hinges on how promotions cause a particular type of misalignment between the interests of workers and the …rm. Workers at low levels of the job ladder over-perform on tasks that are heavily valued at higher levels of the ladder (and therefore that the …rm gives considerable weight to when making promotion decisions) and strategically shirk on other tasks that the …rm would prefer they emphasize. A salesperson might, for example, focus more on demonstrating his leadership aptitude than on the main function of his current job, which is making sales. Although from a productivity standpoint the …rm would like the workers at a lower rung of the job ladder to weight various tasks in a particular way, those workers will instead behave according to the weights dictated in the promotion rule, so as to strengthen their case for promotion. This multitasking problem, though fundamental, has been neglected in the literature on promotion tournaments.
Our model describes a setting in which employers design promotion systems with both incentives and job assignment in mind. There are two workers and one …rm, all risk neutral. There are two periods and a two-level job hierarchy in which each of the two jobs has the same two tasks, though the tasks vary in their relative importance (i.e. contribution to output) across jobs. Output is determined by e¤ort and ability, both of which are task-speci…c.
2 Initially, the …rm is ignorant of worker abilities when the workers begin their careers in the low-level job. After a period of work, the …rm observes the relative performances of the workers on each task, and on the basis of those observations the …rm promotes one of the workers to the high-level job and retains the other in the low-level job. The promotion rule is based on a weighted average of the relative performance signals on each task, where the …rm commits to the weights upfront and communicates them to the workers. As usual, the workers dislike e¤ort but are motivated by the wage increase attached to promotion, and the weights the …rm assigns in the promotion rule shape the workers' …rst-period allocation of e¤ort across the two tasks. In particular the workers strategically shirk on the task that is under-emphasized in the promotion rule, even if it is the …rm's preferred task on productivity grounds. The di¢ culty the …rm faces is that it would like workers in the low-level job to emphasize the task that is relatively more productive in that job, but from the standpoint of second-period productivity the …rm wants to be sure that the worker who is promoted is the one who is relatively better at the task emphasized in the high-level job. The natural promotion rule would lead workers in the low-level job to overemphasize the task that is most highly valued in the high-level job and that is therefore weighted heavily in the promotion rule. To mitigate this incentive problem, the …rm might choose the promotion rule in a way that puts less (more) weight on the task emphasized in the high-level (low-level) job, compared to what it would do in the absence of an incentive problem. The main result is greater balance between the tasks in the stated promotion rule than what would be expected strictly on productivity grounds and absent incentive considerations.
This also suggests that in the interests of preserving incentives the …rm may wish to promote people who have invested in a broad range of skills, even those not heavily emphasized in the higher-level job. Broadening jobs to include multiple productive tasks -as opposed to a single task as is standard in the tournament literature -allows us to explain an interesting (and at …rst glance puzzling) aspect of promotion decisions. Although we typically think that promotions are merit-based and that excellence in one's current position will ultimately be rewarded by future promotion, in practice this does not always happen. For a variety of reasons, such as organizational politics or outright mistakes by the employer, a worker who excels in a given job is sometimes passed over for promotion in favor of a colleague whose performance in that same job seems less impressive. In fact, as we document later, anecdotal evidence supports the view that in some cases promotions are denied precisely because someone excels in their job. That is, some workers may simply be too good to promote out of their current jobs. Ironically, by striving for excellence in the job at hand, a worker might condemn himself to remain in it forever by making himself "indispensable". While the concept has been neglected in the economics literature, it is su¢ ciently popular that it has acquired its own name in management circles -Putt's Law. The "Law" is typically de…ned by the following quote:
"Technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage and those who manage what they do not understand." -Archibald Putt (2006) According to Putt's Law, those who are promoted are often not those who have demonstrated the greatest talents. We show how Putt's Law and its implications can be understood in the context of an economic model in which …rms optimally design promotion systems. Putt's Law is one observable implication of the model. Another is balance (across tasks) in the promotion rule, and others relating to balance are based on the degree to which jobs di¤er (in the productivity weights attached to tasks) across hierarchical levels. Yet another implication, which arises from an extension of our model, is that promotion tournaments and output-based pay contracts like bonuses or piece rates go hand in hand. We discuss all of these testable implications in Section 5.
Our analysis relates to DeVaro and Gürtler (2012) , which introduces the concept of strategic shirking in a setting in which there is no job hierarchy and therefore no promotions. That analysis provides a theoretical explanation for the practice of multitasking workers even after the …rm has observed their task-speci…c productivities. The main result is that committing early on to a practice of late-stage multitasking can be optimal in that it mitigates the incentive problem caused by strategic shirking. The result in the present paper that (in response to the threat of strategic shirking) the …rm may opt to commit to a promotion rule that involves more balance between the two tasks echoes the multitasking result from the earlier paper. In the earlier analysis workers "overwork" on a preferred task and strategically shirk on a less favored one. Similar behavior occurs in the present analysis, though the reason one task is preferred is not because of exogenous worker preferences over tasks but rather because showing promise on that task increases the likelihood of a wage-enhancing promotion, because it directly links to skills that are highly valued by the …rm in the high-level job.
The analysis also relates to the large literature on promotion tournaments, most of which assumes a unidimensional productivity-enhancing worker choice variable (either a human capital investment or, more commonly, an e¤ort choice). Whereas the literature's focus is on how the optimal e¤ort level compares to the …rst best, ours is on the distortion of e¤ort across multiple tasks in a given job. The branch of the tournament theory literature concerning sabotage is also related in that workers can allocate their attention to both productive work (i.e. e¤ort) and unproductive or destructive work (i.e. sabotage).
3 Our analysis also relates to a small number of prior studies considering tournaments with multiple activities. In Clark and Konrad (2007) , worker e¤ort is chosen at constant marginal cost and spread over n di¤erent dimensions, and a given worker must win at least k of those dimensions to win the tournament prize. In their model, as in the standard tournament literature with unidimensional contests, the principal receives only information on the identity of the winner rather than information specifying the margin of victory on each of the n dimensions. In contrast, in Franckx, D'Amato, and Brose (2004) the employer receives a signal in each of the competitive dimensions, as in our model the employer observes a relative performance signal on each task in the lower-level job. In contrast to these models, in ours there is strategic shirking and also employer learning about worker task-speci…c abilities, and second-period job assignments are made on the basis of this information. 3 See Lazear (1989) , Garvey and Swan (1992) , Drago and Garvey (1998) , Konrad (2000) , Chen (2003) , Kräkel (2005) , Münster (2007) , Gürtler (2008) , and Gürtler and Münster (2010) .
4 See also the model of Prasad and Tran (2012) in which workers can make investments in two types of human capital (general and …rm-speci…c), and only when workers invest in both types of skills do …rms promote them to challenging jobs featuring high returns to skills.
The main tradeo¤ in our model is between …rst-period incentives and secondperiod task assignments. A related tradeo¤ has been noted in the promotions literature. When …rms use promotions both to create incentives and to achieve e¢ cient job assignment, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) observed that it is generally not possible to perfectly achieve both objectives. For example, promoting the best-performing salesperson (as required for incentives) is unlikely to yield the best manager. Furthermore, the sequencing of the decisions of lowerlevel workers and the …rm creates a time-inconsistency problem, as argued in Milgrom and Roberts (1988) . Workers take actions to increase their promotion probabilities, but those investments are already water under the bridge and cannot be undone when the time comes for the …rm to make a promotion decision. Workers su¤er depressed incentives given their anticipation that the …rm will make promotion decisions solely on the basis of e¢ ciency in job assignments. The …rm maximizes total pro…t by adhering to the ex ante optimal promotion rule (that re ‡ects both incentives and job assignment considerations), but in the absence of commitment the …rm will deviate by following the ex post optimal rule that re ‡ects only assignment considerations. As shown in Waldman (2003) , the common practice of favoring internal candidates (as opposed to external recruits) for promotion can be understood as a means by which the …rm commits to the ex ante optimal promotion rule. In the preceding models, the worker's investment is unidimensional so that the distortion caused by time inconsistency leads to underinvestment. In contrast, in our model the worker's investment is two dimensional, so that the relevant distortion arising from time inconsistency is across tasks within the low-level job. Later in the analysis we discuss a possible solution to the commitment problem, in which the …rm prefers not to renege on its promotion rule ex post so as to avoid creating disgruntled workers who might retaliate against their employer in ways that are hard to monitor.
Finally, the paper is closely related to the multitasking literature (e.g. Holmström and Milgrom 1991 , Baker 1992 , 2002 . This literature emphasizes the problems that pay-for-performance schemes entail when workers engage in multiple tasks and some tasks are easier to measure than others. Under a payfor-performance scheme workers have an incentive to focus on those tasks that are captured by the performance measure and, thus, rewarded by the incentive contract, while neglecting the remaining tasks.
5 As a consequence, …rms may set rather weak incentives or may abstain from using pay-for-performance schemes altogether to induce workers to focus on all of their tasks. In the current paper it is not a (distorted) performance measure, but the endogenously chosen promotion rule that induces workers to focus more strongly on one of the tasks. In addition, addressing the multitasking problem by using a more balanced promotion rule leads to a cost in terms of a worse assignment of workers to jobs. Such assignment problems are typically absent in the existing literature on multitasking.
Model description
In a two-period setup, consider a …rm with a two-level job hierarchy. There is one job at each level, where job 1 is the low-level job, and job 2 is the high-level job. Each job consists of two tasks, a and b, that di¤er in relative importance across jobs. 6 The employment relationships begin when the risk-neutral …rm owner (henceforth, the …rm) hires two risk-neutral workers into job 1 at the start of the …rst period. Let t, k, j, and i index periods, jobs, tasks, and workers, respectively. Let a ij denote worker i's ability on task j, which at the outset is unknown to all parties. Suppose a ij is an i.i.d. random variable that is distributed on ( 1; 1) with continuously di¤erentiable pdf g (that has full support) and cdf G, and de…ne a := E [a ij ].
7 Let e t ij 0 denote worker i's e¤ort on task j in period t, which is unobservable to the …rm, and let q > 0 denote the productivity of that e¤ort.
8 Worker i's e¤ort cost is given by c i = c 2 P j;t e t ij
2
(with c > 0). When employed in job k in period t, worker i produces output y
for the …rm, where k 2 (0; 1) (1 k ) measures the importance of task a (task b) in job k. Without loss of generality, 6 The assumption that both tasks are present in both jobs is not restrictive. Our main results continue to hold if task b is excluded from job 2, if additional tasks are introduced at one of the job levels, or even if no tasks are common across jobs. However, in the latter case we could not assume (as we do for simplicity) that the task-speci…c ability distributions are independent. All we require is that the workers'task-speci…c performances in a subset of the tasks in job 1 convey relevant information about expected performance in a subset of the tasks in job 2. Under an assumption of independence of the task-speci…c ability distributions, this requires that at least one task be common to both jobs. The fact that our results continue to hold even with incomplete (or zero) overlap in tasks across jobs is important for empirical tests, given that in practice there is usually less-than-complete overlap in tasks across job levels. 7 The model of Prasad (2009) is another example in which workers are assumed to enter the …rm with di¤erent abilities across tasks. 8 The role of q in the model is to capture the relative importance of e¤ort (as opposed to ability) in determining output, which relates to the model's key tradeo¤ between …rst-period worker incentives and second-period e¢ ciency in task assignments. The importance to the …rm of providing …rst-period incentives to workers in job 1 is increasing in q.
we assume 1 < 2 , so that task a receives relatively more emphasis in the highlevel job. For example, task a might represent leadership activities, whereas task b might represent "actual work", i.e. direct production.
At the end of the …rst period, the …rm observes relative performance signals s j = a 1j + e 1 1j a 2j e 1 2j . These signals are nonveri…able to third parties and thus cannot be used in a formal incentive contract. On the basis of the signals, the …rm promotes one of the workers to job 2 at the start of the second period and retains the other worker in job 1. Letting s ij := a ij + e 1 ij , the …rm promotes worker 1 if and only if s a + (1 )
. For now we assume that the …rm is able to commit to a promotion rule, i.e. to a speci…c choice of 2 (0; 1],at the beginning of period 1, and that the workers observe this when making …rst-period e¤ort choices.
9
Later we discuss the possibility of a commitment problem and how it might be resolved.
We start with the simplifying assumption that wages are exogenously given, where w 1 is the …rst-period wage, w 2H is the second-period wage of the promoted worker, w 2L is the second-period wage of the worker who is not promoted, and (w 2H > w 2L ). Workers'reservation values are normalized to zero. Later in the analysis we allow wages to be endogenously chosen by the …rm. Finally, workers and the …rm discount future payo¤s at factors W 2 (0; 1) and F 2 (0; 1), respectively.
Model solution
We solve the model by backward induction. De…ne S i := s ia + (1 ) s ib , i = 1; 2. As described in the following proposition, the solution for period 2 is strikingly simple.
10
Proposition 1 In period 2, the workers choose e 2 ij = 0 8i; j. The …rm's expected second-period pro…t is given by
9 Since our primary goal is to analyze whether the …rm prefers to set = 1 or < 1, it does not really matter whether the possibility of setting = 0 is included or excluded. Given that we must sometimes divide by in the formal analysis, the case of = 0 would need to be analyzed separately. Since this would lengthen the analysis without providing any new insights, we have excluded the possibility of setting = 0.
1 0 All proofs are in the appendix.
Since the game ends after period 2, the workers choose the minimum e¤ort level.
11 Thus, only the workers' abilities a¤ect second-period pro…t. We have assumed that the relative importance of task a versus b is higher in job 2 than in job 1. Therefore, it is intuitive that ex post the …rm owner would bene…t from promoting the worker who has the higher ability on task a. We formalize this intuition later by demonstrating that, beginning at = 1 expected secondperiod pro…t decreases as is lowered. Turning now to period 1, worker i chooses …rst-period e¤orts to maximize
with l = 1; 2, l 6 = i. The probability that worker i gets promoted can be restated as
The fact that e¤ort is zero is a normalization and should not be taken literally. This should be interpreted as the e¤ort that the workers would choose if there were no (explicit or implicit) incentive pay. Typically, workers exert some "regular" e¤ort level even in the absence of incentive pay, because they experience some utility from working up to a certain point. This regular e¤ort level is normalized to zero in the model. A similar argument can be found in Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Grund and Sliwka (2010) .
Optimal e¤orts of worker i are characterized by the following …rst-order conditions:
Note that
1 2 Of course, such a …rst-order approach is only valid if workers' objective functions are strictly concave. As usual in tournament models, satisfying this condition requires additional assumptions. In particular, the objective function is ensured to be strictly concave for a su¢ ciently large c (see the Appendix for a proof). In the following, we assume that c is large enough that optimal e¤orts can be characterized by the …rst-order conditions.
In the appendix, we show that the equilibrium is symmetric, with both workers choosing the same e¤ort on task j. Then the preceding derivatives become
The following proposition characterizes optimal …rst-period e¤orts:
Proposition 2 Optimal e¤ orts satisfy e The workers exert e¤ort to positively in ‡uence the signal realizations and, thus, to increase the probability of being promoted. Recall that determines the importance of the performance signal on task a for the promotion decision. If = 0:5, both performance signals have the same e¤ect on the promotion decision, so that workers …nd it optimal to allocate the same amount of e¤ort to each task. If instead > 0:5, the performance signal on task a is more important for the promotion decision, and workers shift e¤ort from task b to task a. Similarly, if < 0:5, task b is the more important one so that workers choose higher e¤ort on task b.
Given the preceding considerations, expected …rst-period pro…t can be written as
The following partial derivative describes how this pro…t changes with
Evaluating this derivative as approaches 1, we obtain the following lemma.
The lemma states that …rst-period pro…t increases as decreases from 1. Lowering increases expected …rst-period pro…t by changing the workers' incentives to manipulate the performance signals. If is lowered, the workers are less inclined to shift e¤ort from task b to task a, which in turn boosts the workers'productivities. However, this …rst-period incentive e¤ect must be traded o¤ against a second-period task assignment e¤ect that is countervailing, as shown in the next lemma.
The lemma states that lowering from 1 reduces the …rm's second-period pro…t. This is intuitive. If is maximized, the workers are assigned to the jobs that best match their abilities.
The following proposition shows that there are cases in which the incentive e¤ect dominates the assignment e¤ect. In such cases the …rm …nds it optimal to choose < 1. This means that in the interests of strengthening …rst-period incentives the …rm chooses to take into account performance signals on both tasks when making the promotion decision, even though the promoted worker's skill on task a is the more relevant one.
Proposition 3 There exists a cuto¤ valueq (c; F ; W ) such that the …rm chooses
To understand the logic for Proposition 3, it is helpful to recall that q represents the productivity of the worker's e¤ort and also that second-period equilibrium e¤orts are zero, so that the only role of q in equilibrium is amplifying the e¤ect of …rst-period e¤orts on …rst-period pro…t. The …rst sentence of Proposition 3 says that when q is su¢ ciently high, the …rm decides to consider performance signals on both tasks in the promotion decision. The logic for this result is as follows. From Lemma 1 and its proof, the bene…t to the …rm of considering both performance signals for the promotion decision is an increase in …rst-period pro…t that arises because the workers' weighted total e¤ort on the two tasks increases. Such increases in e¤ort increase …rst-period pro…t to a greater extent the larger is q. Hence, for su¢ ciently large q, the …rm …nds it bene…cial to consider performance signals on both tasks in the promotion decision. This establishes a threshold for q.
The second sentence of Proposition 3 establishes three comparative statics results concerning how the threshold for q varies with the worker's e¤ort cost and with the discount factors of the worker and …rm. 13 Note that an increase in c increases the workers'total and marginal costs of exerting e¤ort, so that the …rm …nds it harder to induce e¤ort. From Lemma 1 and its proof, the way that the …rm induces …rst-period e¤ort is by committing to use both performance signals when making the promotion decision (i.e. reducing ), and when c is higher a reduction in a¤ects …rst-period e¤ort to a lesser extent. This means that when c is high the …rst-period incentive e¤ect shrinks in importance relative to the second-period assignment e¤ect. In this situation the attractiveness to the …rm of considering both performance signals in the promotion decision is diminished, and the …rm would need to see an even greater productivity of e¤ort (i.e. value of q) before deciding to use both signals when deciding about promotion.
From Lemma 1 and its proof, when the workers'discount factor is high …rst-period e¤ort becomes more responsive to a reduction of below 1. The reason the workers invest …rst-period e¤ort is to become promoted so that the higher second-period wage can be collected. The workers' discount factor captures the importance to the workers of receiving this higher second-period wage, and when the discount factor is zero the workers exert no e¤ort on either task. The more the workers care about the future the easier it is for the …rm to create …rst-period incentives via committing to use both performance signals in the promotion decision. In this situation the attractiveness to the …rm of using both signals when making the promotion decision is increased, and the …rm would be willing to commit to it even when the productivity of e¤ort is modest. Hence, the threshold for q diminishes as the workers'discount factor increases.
The intuition for why the threshold for q is increasing in the …rm's discount factor follows from the observation that an increase in the discount factor increases the contribution of second-period pro…t (relative to …rst-period pro…t) in the …rm's total pro…t expression. Recall that when the …rm commits to consider both performance signals when deciding about promotion (i.e. decreases ) this increases …rst-period pro…t at the expense of decreasing second-period pro…t. This expense of decreased second-period pro…t is more pronounced the larger is the …rm's discount factor; for example, in the extreme case in which the …rm has a discount factor of zero, this expense would disappear entirely. In short, when the …rm's discount factor is high and the …rm decreases , the bene…t of the …rst-period incentive e¤ect shrinks in importance relative to the cost of the second-period assignment e¤ect. In this situation the attractiveness to the …rm of considering both performance signals in the promotion decision is diminished, and the …rm would need to see an even greater productivity of e¤ort (i.e. value of q) before being willing to take both signals into account when making the promotion decision.
As noted in the introduction, Putt's Law states that promoted workers "manage what they do not understand" whereas non-promoted workers "understand what they do not manage." The "Law" was …rst articulated in 1981, and a closely related formulation called the "Dilbert Principle" appeared in the 1990s.
14 A corollary to Putt's Law, sometimes referred to either as "Putt's Corollary" or as the "First Corollary to Putt's Law" further states that every technical hierarchy eventually develops a competence inversion, meaning that over time the incompetent workers get promoted to "manage what they do not understand" and the competent ones are left in lower-level jobs to "understand what they do not manage". 15 The fact that our model is characterized by multiple tasks in each job allows us to explain how Putt's Law can be understood as a natural consequence of the …rm's optimizing behavior. Before presenting the formal argument, we consider the question of whether the "Law" has any practical relevance. One might be tempted to dismiss the "Law" as simply re ‡ecting the bloated senses of self-esteem experienced by a subset of workers who were justi…ably denied promotions on performance grounds. But even a cursory review of the anecdotal evidence available online reveals there is more to the notion of "too good to get promoted" than can be explained solely by the delusions of disgruntled workers. Indeed, employers sometimes admit outright to withholding promotions because a worker's performance was too high. For example, consider the following account on the "Yahoo! Answers" website, posted under the heading "I'm too good at my job to get promoted?" I work in the IT industry of a nation-wide corporate medical provider. I have also worked in smaller call centers. My resume is impressive, and I have management and shift lead experience. I left my last job after 2 years as shift lead, because they would not hire me to the open call center manager position. When I spoke with the owner, he told me it was because I was "too valuable on the phones." So now, at my new job, a network engineer opportunity opened, and that's what my degree is in. When I applied for the position, I spoke with the help desk manager and he told me that he'd love to help me progress in my career, but my ticket-completed volume is too high for him to move me o¤ of the phones, and that I was too good to let move right now. I can't get a manager position anywhere else, because I can never get a manager position where I'm at...what am I doing wrong by being so good at my job? Suggestions on what I at people for not doing their assignments -you know, the easy work. Your heart surgeons and your computer programmers -your smart people -aren't in management. That principle was literally happening everywhere." 1 5 A similar competence inversion is predicted by the Peter Principle but for a di¤erent reason. The Peter Principle states that workers are promoted because they are competent in the tasks at hand, and that process continues until they become incompetent because they eventually encounter tasks they cannot handle, whereas Putt's Law and the Dilbert Principle state that workers get promoted precisely because they are incompetent (at least in the tasks emphasized in the low-level job, which are sometimes the most important productive tasks).
could do to improve my career path?
Such examples suggest that Putt's Law is relevant and, importantly, that instances of the Law cannot always be understood as mistakes on the part of …rms. Sometimes …rms purposefully hold back their highest performers, because the opportunity cost of promoting them is too high. Turning now to the formal argument, suppose that task a represents management activities whereas task b is a production task that some workers might view as "real work". If ability on task b is higher for the non-promoted worker than for the promoted worker, this pattern is consistent with Putt's Law. The following argument establishes the likelihood of such a pattern. De…ne A := a 1a a 2a and B := a 1b a 2b . Note that A and B are i.i.d. and symmetric around zero, and denote the pdf by h and the cdf by H. Because both workers choose the same e¤orts, our aim is to determine
and to analyze how this probability depends on . For < 1, we can restate the preceding probability as
Using Bayes'rule, Z ( ) becomes
which in turn can be rewritten as
Note that we can rewrite
which by the symmetry of the distribution is equal to
Hence, we obtain
which is strictly positive. Finally, we can show that Z ( ) is continuous at = 1 since
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 4 If > 0, the non-promoted worker has a higher ability on task b than the promoted worker with positive probability (and the probability is 0.5 when = 1). This ability pattern becomes more likely as increases.
Proposition 4 states that an ability pattern consistent with Putt's Law is observed with positive probability. That is, those workers who are the best performers in the job at hand end up "understanding what they do not manage" whereas those whose productivity in the low-level job is less impressive get promoted to "manage what they do not understand." If = 1, the non-promoted worker has a higher ability on task b than the promoted worker with probability 0.5. Hence, an ability pattern that is consistent with Putt's Law is most likely to be observed if strategic shirking is relatively unimportant so that the …rm …nds it optimal to choose = 1. Firms that are sensitive to the strategic shirking problem can mitigate it by requiring more balance between tasks in the stated promotion rule, so that workers who excel in the task that is most productive in the low-level job are less disadvantaged when it comes to promotion decisions. But as we discuss in the next section, …rms may vary in the extent to which they can credibly commit to a stated promotion rule, and consequently strategic shirking in promotion tournaments (and Putt's Law) may vary in intensity across production settings.
It is worth emphasizing that in our model Putt's Law does not arise as a consequence of ex post mistakes by the …rm but rather as a purposeful choice as part of an optimizing strategy in the case of complete certainty at the moment second-period job assignments are made. An alternative way to generate Putt's Law would be to assume that the employer can only observe error-laden measures of task-speci…c relative performance. In that case, workers who get particularly lucky (meaning that measurement error leads the employer to think they are better than they really are) tend to get promoted in equilibrium. However, given that luck is not persistent, such workers will tend not to perform as well once promoted.
16 Thus, with positive probability a pattern of job assignments consistent with Putt's Law occurs. There is an important di¤erence between this alternative explanation for Putt's Law and our explanation. In the case of the alternative explanation it would be expected that …rms might want to correct mistaken job assignments ex post via demotions when the promoted workers'poor performances become apparent. But demotions tend to be pretty rare in practice. 17 In contrast, in our model, given that there is no uncertainty in the …rm's observations of relative performance, the instances of Putt's Law that occur with positive probability are not mistakes that the …rm would ever wish to correct ex post, and hence there would be no need for demotions. Our model can explain Putt's Law as rational behavior even with complete information, and since no mistakes are made, the situation in equilibrium can be expected to persist with no tendency for demotions or …rings.
Extensions
In this section we consider some extensions of the model. First, we consider the case in which wage levels are endogenously chosen by the …rm rather than exogenously …xed as in the preceding section. Second, we discuss a possible solution to the potential commitment problem the …rm may face in stating the promotion rule upfront. Third, we consider how our results vary with the degree to which jobs are similar across hierarchical levels (in the productivity weights the jobs attach to each task). Fourth, we consider the …rm's optimal promotion policy if a pay-for-performance scheme based on an additional performance signal were feasible.
Endogenous prizes
In this subsection, we analyze whether the previous results continue to hold if the …rm chooses optimal prizes. Following the seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , we assume that the …rm can commit to the payment of the prizes at the beginning of period 1. We further assume that the …rm has complete bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it-o¤er to both workers. In doing so, it must account for the workers' participation constraints in the …rst and second period. We further simplify the situation by assuming F = W =: . The …rm's maximization problem is then given by M ax w1;w 2H ;w 2L ; 2 a + 2 1 qe
It is straightforward to see that the …rm always sets w 1 such that (P C 1 ) binds, i.e. the …rm leaves no rents to the workers. The …rm's maximization problem can thus be rewritten as M ax
We observe that the …rm's expected total pro…t depends only on the di¤erence in prizes, w 2H w 2L , but not on the level of prizes. Without loss of generality, we can therefore set w 2L = 0. We begin by assuming that the …rm chooses = 1, in which case optimal e¤ort on task b is always equal to zero (since
. Because the workers receive no rent, the …rm receives the complete surplus that the workers produce. Hence, the …rm induces the (e¢ cient) e¤ort level on task a that maximizes the surplus. In particular, the …rm chooses w 2H to maximize 
Suppose now that the …rm marginally reduces below 1, but changes w 2H such that the workers still …nd it in their interest to choose e¤ort e 1 ia = q 1 c on task a. This requires a post-promotion wage of
in which case e¤ort on task b would be given by
Note that the additional pro…t from the positive e¤ort on task b is
For su¢ ciently close to 1, the expression is strictly positive, because
Furthermore, if q is su¢ ciently high, this additional pro…t always overcompensates the second-period loss in pro…t due to the reduction in . The following proposition is therefore immediate.
Proposition 5 In the model with endogenous prizes, the …rm always …nds it optimal to set < 1 if q is su¢ ciently high.
Proposition 5 is very intuitive. By changing the size of the prizes, the …rm a¤ects workers'incentives to put forth e¤ort in period 1. The prize structure, however, does not a¤ect the allocation of e¤orts across tasks. To see this, notice that 
which is independent of w 1 , w 2H and w 2L . Hence, even with optimally chosen prizes the …rm sometimes …nds it useful to reduce below 1 to achieve a more desirable allocation of e¤orts across tasks.
Commitment to the stated promotion rule
We have assumed that performance signals are nonveri…able, which seems natural in many economic settings. For example, promotions are often based on subjective assessments of worker performance, which are di¢ cult to verify in court. The problem then is that the …rm may want to lie about the signal realizations and deviate from the stated promotion rule. Suppose, for example, that ex post the …rm's pro…t would be maximized if worker 1 was promoted, but that worker 2 is promoted when the …rm follows the speci…ed promotion rule (this, of course, requires a choice of < 1). Then the …rm could lie about the signal realizations, thereby increasing worker 1's performance relative to that of worker 2 so that worker 1 gets promoted. In the real world, what prevents the …rm from lying about the signal realizations (and thus reneging on an implicit contract with the workers) even when there is nonveri…ability is a fear of getting punished by disgruntled workers. Even if workers have no direct recourse through a third party like a court, they are still in a position to impose costs on the …rm. When it comes to promotions, if contest rules are stated, and if the parties all see that worker 2 performs better but worker 1 gets the promotion, worker 2 is disgruntled and may take steps to sabotage the …rm. On the other hand, if 1 performs better than 2 and gets the promotion, 2 is not disgruntled because he knew the rules and knows he lost fair and square. Basically in an ongoing employment relationship, it is costly to the …rm to have disgruntled workers around.
One way to incorporate this idea in the model is the following: Suppose that e t ij is no longer bounded below by 0 but can assume any value on the real line. The workers'expected utility function is the same as before except that a new term is subtracted from it, namely I t i e t ij , where > 0, and I t i is an indicator function equaling 1 if worker i, in period t, failed to get promoted even though S i > S l . By this de…nition, I t i = 0 in period 1, so that the utility function is the same as in the basic model, and therefore negative choices of e 1 ij are strictly dominated by non-negative ones. But in period 2, if the indicator function turns on because the …rm lies about the signal realizations and deviates from the stated promotion rule, worker i becomes disgruntled and retaliates. So can be interpreted as the worker's "marginal propensity to sabotage the …rm" after being unfairly denied promotion. It may now be optimal for worker i to choose e 2 ij < 0, hurting the …rm's pro…t. For su¢ ciently high , the …rm should never …nd it optimal to lie about the signal realization in equilibrium, even with nonveri…ability.
An argument might be made that if the worker retaliates against the …rm, he will get …red. There are at least two responses to this argument. One is that, in a two-period model, even if the worker is …red, the damage is already done and the …rm has su¤ered costs. Another response is that the sabotage is frequently not visible to the …rm. It is done in subtle ways. In the …rm's eyes, e 2 ij < 0 might very well look the same as e 
Similarity of tasks across hierarchical levels
Hierarchies can be classi…ed according to the "degree to which tasks are similar across hierarchical levels". Compare two hierarchies. One is in academia, with assistant professors in job 1 and associate professors in job 2, where the tasks are essentially identical at both levels. Another is computer programmers at the bottom and managers at the top, so that tasks di¤er substantially across levels. Our model captures task variety by means of the di¤erence 2 1 . When this di¤erence increases, tasks across hierarchical levels di¤er to a larger extent. In this section, we analyze how 2 1 a¤ects decisions in our model. We start by varying 2 while keeping 1 constant.
It is straightforward to see that workers' e¤orts do not depend on 2 , so we can focus on the …rm's choice of . It is also straightforward to see that 1 is independent of 2 , and hence
However, 2 has an impact on second-period pro…t and, in particular, on the marginal e¤ect of an increase in on second-period pro…t. In the proof of Lemma 2 we have demonstrated that
is strictly positive. This means that the …rm is more inclined to choose = 1 if 2 increases and tasks across hierarchical levels di¤er more strongly. Put di¤erently, if tasks across hierarchical levels di¤er signi…cantly, the …rm is more likely to promote a "specialist" who has demonstrated high ability on task a (even if his ability on task b is rather low).
The di¤erence 2 1 would also be increased if 1 were lowered while keeping 2 constant. Changing 1 leads to a more complex analysis, because 1 a¤ects both …rst-period and second-period pro…t. In the proof of Lemma 1 we have shown that
from which we obtain
Hence, if 1 is lowered, lim !1
becomes lower as well (i.e. more negative). This means that the …rm becomes more inclined to set below 1, as a lower value of 1 implies that task b becomes relatively more important, so that the …rm wants to increase workers'e¤ort on that task.
In the proof of Lemma 2 we have demonstrated that
Hence, we observe that
which is strictly negative since
gets higher, which implies that the …rm is more inclined to choose = 1 and to promote a "specialist".
In summary, an increase in 2 1 has countervailing e¤ects on the …rm's decision to set = 1 or < 1. A higher value for 2 1 (regardless of whether it results from higher 2 ; lower 1 ; or both) implies that it is more important for the …rm to promote the right employee. That is, selection becomes more important since tasks across hierarchical levels di¤er more strongly. As a result, the …rm is more inclined to choose = 1, i.e. to promote a worker solely based on his ability on task a. At the same time, there may be incentive considerations that act in the opposite direction. If 1 decreases, the importance of task b for performance in job 1 increases. The …rm then wants to increase workers' incentive to put forth e¤ort on task b, which it achieves by setting below 1. Which of these e¤ects dominates depends on several parameters, such as the …rm's discount factor, F .
Performance pay based on an additional performance measure
In the analysis from Section 3 the …rm achieves a desirable assignment of workers to jobs when it sets = 1. In that case, however, workers in the low-level job focus entirely on the task that is relatively more important in the high-level job.
As noted in the introduction, the multitasking literature has identi…ed a similar problem of e¤ort misallocation. In particular, in a situation with imperfect (or distorted) measures of performance, workers focus on the tasks that are easier to measure and that are thus rewarded in an incentive contract based on the imperfect performance measure.
Although the results of our paper and those of the multitasking literature are related, there is one important di¤erence. A promotion rule with = 1 induces workers to put forth high e¤ort on the task that is relatively more important in the high-level job. An incentive contract based on an imperfect performance measure induces workers to focus on those tasks that are easy to measure. In many practical situations, the tasks that are relevant in high-level jobs are those that are not easy to formally measure and verify. This means that the promotion tournament with = 1 induces workers to focus on those tasks that are typically neglected if performance pay based on an imperfect performance measure were the only instrument to motivate workers. Put di¤erently, if a pay-for-performance scheme based on an imperfect performance measure was complemented by a promotion tournament with = 1, the …rm could achieve an optimal allocation of e¤orts across tasks and at the same time a desirable assignment of workers to jobs.
To be more speci…c, suppose that task a is a "managerial task", whereas task b represents "actual production". Assume that the total number of products that worker i produces in period t is veri…able and denote this performance measure by p t i . It is reasonable to assume that worker i produces more products if he puts forth more e¤ort on task b and if his task-speci…c ability is higher. Given that luck may also play a role, we assume p t i is given by p
where b is a strictly positive constant and " t is a random variable. Without loss of generality, we assume that the …rm pays worker i a piece-rate i for every unit produced. In this case it is easy to see that the …rm can induce e¢ cient (…rst-period) e¤orts and at the same time a desirable assignment of workers to jobs. As shown in Section 4.1, the …rm could set = 1 to solve the problem of assignment, choose w 2H w 2L to induce e¢ cient e¤ort on task a and use w 1 to extract all rents from the workers. In addition, it could now use the piece-rate i to induce e¢ cient e¤ort on task b and, thus, to solve the problem of misallocation of e¤ort across tasks.
The argument in this subsection is related to that of Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) . The so-called "Baker-Jensen-Murphy puzzle" argues that it is puzzling that …rms use promotions to achieve both incentives and assignment. It would seem more logical for …rms to use promotions strictly for e¢ cient job assignment, relying on output-based pay (such as piece-rates or bonuses) to achieve incentives. This would avoid the tradeo¤ between incentives and assignment that frequently occurs. There is one important di¤erence between that argument and ours. In our model, the …rm bene…ts from using a promotion tournament (with = 1) by achieving an e¢ cient assignment of workers to jobs (as in Baker, Jensen and Murphy), but also by motivating workers to put forth e¤ort on task a (which is di¤erent from Baker, Jensen and Murphy). If the performance measure were given by p t i = b (a ib + e t ib ) + " t and if the …rm were to rely solely on p t i to incentivize the workers it could never induce them to put forth e¤ort on task a. The advantage of the tournament is that it rewards e¤ort on the task that is relatively more important in the high-level job (i.e. the managerial task). This means that the tournament is needed to achieve an optimal mix of e¤orts, and not only for assignment purposes.
Testable Implications
The main observable implication of the model is balance in the promotion rule, meaning the …rm bases promotions in part on performance in tasks that are predominantly associated with the lower-level job, even though those tasks are de-emphasized in the higher-level job. The likelihood of balance in the promotion rule varies by how easy it is for workers to strategically shirk and how costly such shirking is to the …rm, as well as by how di¢ cult it is for the …rm to commit ex ante to the promotion rule. In production settings where the …rm has trouble credibly committing or where strategic shirking is prohibitively costly to workers and therefore less likely to pose problems for the …rm, balance in the promotion rule should be less likely, meaning the …rm more often promotes workers on the basis of their pro…ciencies in the tasks that are most heavily emphasized in the high-level job. In contrast, the greater the threat of strategic shirking (or the easier it is for the …rm to commit) the more likely it is that the …rm bases promotion decisions on performance in the tasks most heavily emphasized in the lower-level job, thereby creating a more balanced rule. Identifying production settings in which strategic shirking is likely to be a strong or weak threat (or where commitment is di¢ cult or easy) would allow these predictions to be tested. A related implication of balance in the promotion rule is that the …rm may wish to promote workers who have invested in acquiring a broad range of skills, even those not heavily emphasized in the higher-level job.
Another implication of the model follows from the …rst sentence of Proposition 3 and can be tested if the researcher observes variation in the importance of e¤ort (as opposed to ability) in determining performance, as captured by q in the model. When the relative importance of e¤ort increases, balance in the promotion rule is more likely to occur. Furthermore, from the second sentence of Proposition 3, the promotion rule should be more balanced when the cost of worker e¤ort is low, when the …rm heavily discounts the future, and when the worker lightly discounts the future. An approach for operationalizing these tests is to use a probit model in which the dependent variable is a binary measure of whether the promotion rule is balanced, and the underlying latent index is modeled as a linear function of q, c, F and W , or whatever subset of those four variables is observed in the data. The latent index is modeled as increasing (decreasing) in q and W (c and F ), so that the probability of balance in the promotion rule is increasing (decreasing) in q and W (c and F ), as the theory predicts.
Another observable implication of our model is that Putt's Law occurs with positive probability, meaning in some cases the promoted worker is less competent than the non-promoted worker in the tasks that are emphasized in the lower-level job and that are used as a basis for promotion decisions. Furthermore, Putt's Law is more likely to occur when the promotion rule becomes less balanced. A further point related to Putt's Law is that our theory has implications for the estimated coe¢ cients of performance measures in regressions of promotion probabilities or wages. When empirical measures of job performance are available they are usually job speci…c rather than task speci…c, and they do not always completely capture all dimensions of performance that are relevant for evaluating a worker's suitability for promotion. Furthermore, it seems fair to say that the dimensions of performance in lower-level positions that are most di¢ cult to measure tend to be those that are emphasized in higher-level jobs (e.g. "managerial potential"). Suppose task a involves "leadership" and task b involves more concrete tasks like sales, and further suppose that the observed lower-level job performance measures fail to capture task a. To the extent that …rms weight leadership performance heavily in promotion rules (i.e. assign high values of ) a regression of wages, wage growth attached to promotion, or promotion probability might exhibit small or even negative coe¢ cients on measured performance, for reasons related to Putt's Law and the fact that the observed job-speci…c performance measure captures skills in task b more than in task a. However, an insight of our model is that strategic shirking (and in particular the …rm's behavioral response to combat that incentive problem) mitigates this estimation issue. The logic is that the threat of strategic shirking encourages the …rm to assign greater weight in the promotion rule to tasks that are emphasized in the lower-level job (and that are more easily measured and likely to be re ‡ected in the overall performance measures typically available in datasets). This tightens the positive relationship between observed performance and promotion probability (and consequently between performance and the wage gains attached to promotion). An implication is that when the estimated regression coe¢ cients on performance are small or even negative, this evidence might suggest settings in which strategic shirking is unlikely to be a major concern for the …rm (or commitment is particularly hard) so that promotion decisions can be made largely on the basis of intangible factors related to expected managerial performance that are di¢ cult to quantify in standard performance ratings.
Yet another observable implication of the model concerns the degree to which tasks are similar across job levels. Recall that 2 1 measures the degree to which tasks are similar across levels, with smaller values of this di¤erence indicating greater similarity. There are countervailing e¤ects of similarity on the likelihood of balance in the promotion rule. A higher value for 2 solely based on his performance in the tasks emphasized in the higher-level job. However, if a higher value of 2 1 occurs only because 1 decreases, the tasks traditionally emphasized in the lower-level job become even more important for performance in that job. This encourages the …rm to inject balance into the promotion rule, which in turn encourages workers to increase their e¤ort on those tasks. As noted earlier, which of the two countervailing e¤ects dominates depends on parameters such as the …rm's discount factor.
These predictions concerning the e¤ect of similarity in tasks across job levels on the degree of balance in the promotion rule can, in principle, be tested. Doing so requires data on the tasks used at each job level so that it is possible to measure the extent to which tasks di¤er across levels. If such information is available over time for a given …rm, as in DeVaro, Ghosh and Zoghi (2012) , then it is possible to observe not only whether 2 1 increased, decreased, or stayed the same from period t to period t + 1 but the nature of the change (e.g. whether an increase in 2 1 occurred because 2 increased, 1 decreased, or both changes occurred simultaneously). Identifying the nature of changes in 2 1 is important for empirical tests, given the countervailing e¤ects noted in the preceding paragraph.
One production setting that might be suitable for testing the prediction concerning 2 1 is academia, where there are two clearly identi…able tasks (research and teaching) for which performance data are often available over time for individual professors at all job levels. Consider two job levels called "junior" and "senior" faculty. Let 1 and 2 denote the productivity weights on research for junior and senior faculty, respectively. From a university's standpoint, an example of an increase in 2 (holding 1 constant) might be an increase in the availability of external grant funding. Assuming that grants are most likely to be awarded to researchers with clearly established records who are experts in their …elds (a status more likely to apply to seniors than to juniors) and who continue to actively publish, the return to the university (in terms of increased likelihood of grant funding) of the marginal publication would increase for seniors relative to juniors. Alternatively, a decrease in 1 holding 2 constant might represent a decrease in external funding opportunities that are earmarked for early-career scholars. These two di¤erent ways in which 2 1 might increase have di¤erent observable implications for the degree of balance in the university's promotion rule, as explained earlier.
An observable implication of the extension in Section 4.4 is that …rms use promotion tournaments and bonuses (or piece rates) simultaneously. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that these two forms of incentives do in fact go hand in hand. DeVaro and Waldman (2012) note that in private correspondence Daniel Parent reported that in the PSID data used in Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) "bonuses and promotions are positively correlated, even controlling for unmeasured worker e¤ects". DeVaro and Waldman (2012) found the same result in the single-…rm personnel data used in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a,b) .
Conclusion
A signi…cant volume of theoretical and empirical literature supports the view that promotions create powerful incentives for workers. Most studies in tournament theory assume workers engage in only a single productive task so that there is only one way to impress the boss, and in this case shirking is not an attractive option for workers. But when jobs are comprised of multiple tasks, weak performance on one task can be compensated by stellar performance on another. When this idea is combined with the notion that employers make future job assignments on the basis of observations of workers'earlier task-speci…c performances, an incentive problem arises whereby workers strategically shirk on some tasks and over-perform on others, so as to enhance their promotion chances. Anticipating the multitasking incentive problem, the …rm is encouraged to choose a more balanced promotion rule that assigns some weight to performance in tasks that are important in lower-level jobs but less important in higher-level jobs. Casual observation and anecdotal evidence support the notion that workers distort their e¤orts across tasks so as to enhance their promotion chances, and that when they fail to do so they are sometimes labeled "too good to promote" and "indispensable" in their current jobs. The theory gives rise to a rich set of testable implications and o¤ers an explanation for Putt's Law. Although multitasking has been central to the literature on incentive compensation contracts, it has been neglected in the promotions literature despite having important implications as we have just shown.
We conclude by providing two ideas for future research that build on this analysis. To borrow terminology from Waldman (2012) , our analysis has focused on the "classic" wage generating mechanism in which the …rm strategically chooses wage levels to induce the optimal worker behavior, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Prendergast (1993) . An alternative that has received increasing attention in the literature is the "market-based" wage generating mechanism in which the wage spread from promotion arises as the result of competing bids from other …rms in the labor market, as in Waldman (1984) .
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Our …rst idea for future research is to analyze that case, and our impression is that the central ideas we develop here should also apply in that alternative setting. The reason is that workers care only about the fact that promotions come with wage increases and not about the reason for those wage increases. So as long as workers can allocate e¤ort across tasks, and the resulting performance signals convey useful information to the …rm about how to assign workers in the future, the strategic shirking problem and its implications should be present.
A second idea is to integrate the …rm's job design decision into our framework for strategic shirking in promotion tournaments. In our analysis the tasks in each job were exogenously given. But in practice …rms purposefully bundle certain tasks together into jobs that are then organized in a hierarchy. Our analysis reveals that there are important incentive considerations that should in‡uence the way in which …rms design jobs. For example, from the standpoint of employer learning, it makes sense to design jobs so that performance on tasks in lower-level jobs is highly informative about expected performance in higher-level jobs. But doing so simultaneously exacerbates the strategic shirking problem. In production settings in which the prospect of strategic shirking is particularly costly (or when the …rm faces serious commitment problems), the …rm might wish to voluntarily forgo valuable information by designing jobs in such a way that performance in lower-level tasks conveys little useful information about performance in higher-level tasks, thereby mitigating or circumventing strategic shirking. This is just one potential example of the interesting implications we believe might emerge from an integration of our analysis with the …rm's job design problem. It is easy to see that both these conditions are always ful…lled if c is su¢ ciently large.
Symmetry of equilibrium
As shown before, the two workers'…rst-period expected payo¤s are given by Since the respective left-hand-sides of both conditions are the same, the righthand-sides must also be the same, and therefore e 
Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Obviously, workers put forth zero e¤ort because e¤ort is costly, and there is no future bene…t to exerting it given that the game ends after period 2. Expected second-period pro…t is thus given by 
